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What do we call a ‘Muslim’ in Europe? This is
a seldom-asked question in response to
which there are two approaches: the ethnic
one and the purely religious one. The more
common approach in Europe is to consider
Muslims as a quasi-ethnic group, identifying
them with people originating from Muslim
countries, as it is the case in Belgium.1 M a n y
British Muslims are campaigning to make
the ‘Inter Races Relations Act’ (which allows
to sue for defamation) applicable to Islam.
In this sense, being Muslim has nothing to
do with faith and belief, but rather with ori-
gin and culture. The stricto sensu r e l i g i o u s
aspect is diluted in a larger form of identity.
But the problem is that nowadays pristine
ethnic cultures are fading away, either
through assimilation or because they are re-
cast into new sets of identities. Neverthe-
less, for the first immigrants as well as the
European public opinion (comforted by the
culturalist approach of many anthropolo-
gists or social workers), Islam is embedded
in such pristine cultures (‘Arab’, ‘Asian’). But
these cultures are not transmitted as such
from generation to generation: language
might be lost (as is colloquial Arabic in
France) as well as dress and diet. A process
of acculturation is under way, even if it does
not lead to integration, but to other pat-
terns of differences. The b e u r (slang for
Arab) culture of the suburbs in France has
nothing to do with Islam or even with Arab
culture: the slang (v e r l a n) is French, the diet
and the clothing are American (Mc Donald’s
and baseball caps), the music is western
(rap, ‘hip-hop’), they are fond of dogs such
as, for example, pit bulls. In fact, this is a typ-
ical western urban youth sub-culture: the
terms used to qualify such groups might be
taken from the ethnic register, but we have
here the process of ethnicisation of a space
of social exclusion along the patterns of a
western urban sub-culture, and not through
importation of patterns from the primary
culture. In this sense, any endeavour to de-
fine a ‘Muslim community’ by retaining the
criteria of origin, does not refer to Islam as
such. It also does not refer to ‘real’ cultures.
What we have here is the fabrication of a
neo-ethnicity. It may work, but has little to
do with Islam.
We have to go back to a very basic idea:
Islam is a religion, not an ethnic identity,
not even a culture as such. But how can this
religion be expressed as such? It is not a
question of inter-faith dialogue: Europe is
no longer a Christian society, it is a secular
one. What we see is that Muslims do adapt,
not by changing Islam, but by adjusting
their way of thinking of themselves as be-
l i e v e r s .
Islamic identity
Believers who want to maintain a purely
Islamic identity are also confronted by the
fact that pristine cultures divide the Muslim
community in Europe. Mosques tend to be
attended in Europe according to common
origin, dialect, or by belonging to communi-
ty groups. There are ’Moroccan’, ‘Algerian’,
‘Punjabi’ and even ‘Kurdish’ mosques. For
many second or third generation Muslims,
or even for ‘born-again Muslims’ identifying
Islam and culture of origin is a mistake for
two reasons: it is a dividing factor, but it also
tends to embed Islam in cultural traditions
which have little to do with ‘true Islam’. The
‘salafist’ approach, which stresses the return
to an authentic Islam, rid of local traditions
and superstitions, fits well with the contem-
porary process of acculturation. Its propo-
nents strive to build non-ethnic mosques
and communities. To bypass the cultural di-
visions brought by pristine cultures, they
tend to advocate the use of language of the
host country (English, French, etc.), which is,
by the way, the main if not the sole lan-
guage understood by the youth, or to push
for modern Arabic. In both cases, they go
along with the process of acculturation and
globalization. In this sense, modern funda-
mentalism is not a leftover of traditional cul-
tures, but on the contrary, an expression of
modernization and globalization. Religion is
voided from its cultural content (there is no
such thing, for a fundamentalist, as ‘Islamic’
music, or even an Islamic novel). Religion is
assimilated to a code of behaviour (‘do’s’
and ‘do not’s’), and not to a culture. In this
sense, it can adapt to a world where nation-
al cultures are giving way to codes of com-
munication and sub-cultures.
’Born again Muslims’
A second consequence of the immigration
is that there is no longer any social evidence
of religion. Of course in neighbourhoods
where large Muslim populations are concen-
trated, there is some social pressure to adopt
a conservative way of life (especially for
women). But there are no social constraints
or even inducements to behave as a good
Muslim; praying, fasting, eating halal require
personal involvement. One has to re-create,
on an individual basis, the patterns of an
everyday life for a Muslim. Even if one joins
specific communities (with or without a
neighbourhood basis), this community is es-
tablished on the basis of a volunteer and
personal engagement. In fact, to be a ‘true’
Muslim is an individual choice, because it
usually means a double break: with a too tra-
ditional familial environment and with the
dominant secular society. Here we meet the
phenomena of the ‘born again Muslim’, who
after a very mundane and sometimes dis-
solute life (e.g. womanizing, alcohol, drugs)
goes back to Islam, after a spiritual experi-
ence, on patterns very similar to many ‘born
again Christians’: the emphasis is here on
personal conversion, redeeming and expres-
sion of self, not on community and social
conformism. The terms ‘faith’, ‘salvation’,
that is the quest for identity and psychologi-
cal balance, are more important than ‘licit’
and ‘illicit’. Stories of conversions underline
this quest for equilibrium and happiness.
Fundamentalism, even in its stress on the
communitarian nature of Islam, goes also
along the individualization of social life,
common to the western societies.
This lack of evidence can also been seen in
the problem of authority: Who is entitled to
teach Islam? The famous institutions of the
Muslim world, like the University of Al Ahzar,
in Cairo, retain some prestige but are unable
to meet the religious needs of the Muslim in
Europe: training of modern imams, adapta-
tion of the curriculum of studies, etc. But the
problem is not so much a lack of trained
ulema: in fact the vacuum is filled by self-
proclaimed thinkers, who, whatever their in-
tellectual background, claim that they know
and can teach ‘true Islam’. The web is full of
sites emanating from individuals or small
communities, which share two patterns: a
high level of fragmentation and the stress on
The presence of a rather important Muslim popula-
tion in Western European countries is a consequence
of a recent voluntary immigration of workers coming
from the Middle East, North Africa or South Asia.
Their administrative status and social integration
vary considerably from one country to the other
(often citizens in France and UK, rarely in Germany).
Until recently they kept a low profile. But through
upward social mobility or the ‘brain-drain’ from the
rest of the Muslim world, a Muslim intelligentsia has
slowly emerged in Europe and is now more vocal in
calling for a recognition of the Muslim presence, trig-
gering heated debates in European public opinion. 
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true Islam. In a word, the modern communi-
ty is virtual, and not embedded in a society
or a territory.2 This individual re-appropria-
tion of knowledge and authority is also an
indicator of the westernization of the rela-
tion to religion.
Of course, the ‘salafi’ or fundamentalist an-
swer to westernization and globalization is
not the only answer, even if it is the more vis-
ible. In fact most of the Muslims who would
define themselves as ‘believers’ tend to find
their own personal way of adapting to this
western environment, which by the way is
not a ‘Christian’ one, but a secular one. There
is no symmetry between religions, because
the western religions have left the public
scene to become private. The process we are
witnessing today is one of individualization
and privatization of religious practices, of
the relation of the self with religion.
Here we come to another issue. It is wide-
ly admitted, among western public opinion,
that westernization should go along with an
aggiornamento in theology and religious
thinking, a ‘liberal Islam’ as opposed to fun-
damentalist Islam. Of course there are many
Islamic thinkers working on this issue. But
their impact on the Muslim population
seems rather weak. Any visit to an Islamic
bookshop shows that the most popular
books are not related to an ‘enlightened’
perception of Islam, but to basic or even
fundamentalist description of what religion
is and what the duties of the believer are.
But this is not in contradiction with the
‘salafi’ trends within the Muslim popula-
tions. In fact, the two real trends which are
working among the European Muslims are:
firstly, a vocal fundamentalist school of
thought, trying to build a reconstructed
community by preaching individuals, and
addressing the real concerns of individuals
who lost most of their community links; and
secondly, the silent majority of the believ-
ers, who found their way on the basis of
compromises, adaptations, and makeshift
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theology. The real processes at work among
the Muslim are that of individualization and
reconstruction of identities along different
patterns, all phenomena that undermine
the very idea of ‘one’ Muslim community in
Europe. There is no Western Islam, there are
Western Muslims. ♦
